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LIBERALISM, FAITH, AND
THE VIRTUE OF ‘ANXIETY’
Derek Malone-France

I argue for a re-appropriation of the religious/philosophical concept of ‘anxiety’ regarding human finitude and fallibility as an ‘epistemic virtue’ that
should frame the relationship between personal (including religious) belief
and political participation and procedures. I contend that moral justifications
of liberal norms based on ‘respect for persons’ and ‘tolerance’ are insuﬃcient
without relation to such a (complementary) epistemic basis. Furthermore, I
argue that a careful examination of the internal logic of religious belief, per
se, undermines traditional understandings of ‘faith’ (as being categorically
opposed to ‘doubt’) and reveals support for liberal norms as an necessary
implication thereof.

The liberal personality thrives not on a harmonious inner life,
but on both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ value plurality,
and a consequent unease or dissatisfaction.1
And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue.2
In his essay “Charting Liberal Virtues,” quoted above, political theorist
Stephen Macedo gestures toward a central feature of the psychology of
classical liberalism: a permanent—and productive—sense of epistemic anxiety, especially in relation to value judgments and the knowledge claims
that frame them. Indeed, as I will argue below, principled liberalism requires acceptance of such a sense of anxiety as an inescapable aspect of
authentic human experience. For the logic of liberalism depends upon an
open-ended acknowledgement of the uncertainty of human understandings, including one’s own. If one is utterly certain, beyond any measure of
doubt, about the rightness of one’s own perspective, morals, lifestyle, etc.,
then one has no reason to be either epistemically anxious or liberal.3
Of course, some measure of liberalism may be embraced simply as a
modus vivendi. One may not have the necessary numerical, economic, or
technological advantage to be able to enforce one’s will (piece meal or
wholesale), in which case one may compromise with others in order to
avoid having someone else’s will enforced on oneself. But such a purely pragmatic aﬃrmation represents a merely strategic, not a principled,
liberalism. Genuine liberalism is not simply a political technique. It is a
commitment to certain fundamental moral, anthropological, and, even,
metaphysical assumptions—and their normative implications. Liberalism
makes use of political techniques in order to manifest its commitments,
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but it shouldn’t be confused with these techniques on account of that fact.
The Federalist4 is not just a user’s manual; it is also an argument for a liberal understanding of the human condition. The quintessentially liberal
pledge to “defend to the death” the right of another to speak an opinion of
which one disapproves5 would represent a violation of the very rationale
for accepting liberal norms from the point-of-view of the merely pragmatic democrat. And such a pledge is pure lunacy from the perspective
of anyone claiming an inerrant understanding of the right or the good.
To repeat, then, an authentic (and steadfast) aﬃrmation of classical liberal values requires a certain epistemic stance, a stance that involves some
measure of anxiety, the sort of anxiety that is bred of doubt.6
One aim of this essay is to show that the inverse of this logic also holds
true. Insofar as one acknowledges, even implicitly, that one is fallible and,
therefore, incapable of “utter certainty,” then one must feel some anxiety
about the epistemic status of one’s beliefs and judgments. And insofar as
one feels such anxiety, one is normatively obligated to aﬃrm basic liberal
democratic principles, especially as relating to individual autonomy, the
right of dissent, and the normativity of non-coercive deliberative discourse. More specifically, I will argue that the sort of anxiety just described
represents an epistemic virtue, a cognitively basic response to the reality of
human fallibility that should be understood as not only absolutely central
to the liberal ethos and foundational to liberal norms but also definitively
required by authentic religious commitment.
I will begin with a brief discussion of the historical context from which I
am drawing this understanding of ‘anxiety’ (and its connection to classical
liberalism), highlighting the contact between philosophical and religious
themes that has been associated with the history of this concept. Next, I
will explain my characterization of such anxiety as an ‘epistemic virtue’
and why I believe that it is the most fundamental of all liberal virtues,
more fundamental, even, than ‘tolerance’ (which, I will show, ultimately
rests on anxiety). Then, I will describe the phenomenology of epistemic
anxiety and its role in democratic politics, contrasting my understanding
with that set forth in a recent study of the function of anxiety in American democratic discourse by the political scientist George Marcus.7 And,
finally, I will discuss, in detail, the connection between epistemic anxiety
and social and political tolerance, with particular attention to the relationship between anxiety and religious faith.
Modernity, Anxiety, and Liberalism
The notion of ‘anxiety’—angst, anxiété, etc.—played an important role
in late-modern philosophy and theology, beginning with Kierkegaard’s
psycho-philosophical explorations of human subjectivity and belief and
culminating in prominent philosophical and theological anthropologies
of the early- and mid-twentieth century. In both its philosophical and
theological formulations the term ‘anxiety’ generally denoted a profound
awareness of human finitude and the various existential predicaments
associated with it. One such predicament arises from the epistemic implications of finitude: On the one hand, we are rational beings, with the
capacity to explore the nature of the world around us and to construct
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interpretations of its structure and significance. On the other hand, we
are also finite beings, whose perspectives and, therefore, understandings
are contingent and incomplete. Hence, our conceptions of ‘the truth,’ particularly with regard to human purpose and moral judgment, are not, and
never can be, absolutely reliable.8
In the early-modern west, the systematic recognition of humanity’s fallibility-in-finitude emerged along with the rise of deism during the seventeenth and (early) eighteenth centuries and found support in the critiques of ecclesiastical authority that took root in both philosophical and
theological discourse during the Enlightenment.9 Yet, during this period,
absolute faith in the authority of canonical religious texts (and clerical interpretations of them) was not merely abandoned; it was, for most thinkers, replaced with an equally absolute faith in the authority and power
of ‘reason.’ Thus, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century—when the
‘unity’ and ultimate verifiability of the conclusions of reason began increasingly to be called into question—that the problem of human fallibility
truly emerged in an acute form.10
Kierkegaard may have been the first fully to perceive both the philosophical and religious dimensions of modern anxiety, and his writings on
the subject spurred the development of important philosophical and theological perspectives that took human finitude as the starting point of their
analyses. In philosophy, the various problems associated with human
finitude became a central focus of perhaps the most culturally prominent
school of philosophical thinking of the twentieth century, existentialism.
In theology, the anxiety provoked by an awareness of the implications of
human finitude found prominent and perspicuous formulations in the
writings of thinkers like Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich.11
Although fallibilism has remained a significant theme in both philosophy and theology, however, the concept of anxiety has largely disappeared from the current discourses of these fields. In epistemological terms, any systematic appeal to anxiety regarding human fallibility
has been supplanted by the formulation of ‘coherentist’ understandings
of knowledge and cognition. In moral and political terms, the notion of
‘tolerance’—representing the positively formulated, prescriptive flip-side
of epistemic anxiety—has come to dominate much of the discussion. Of
course, methodologically speaking, such a shift from a negatively framed
to more positively framed formulations of the issue was quite natural. Yet,
in making this shift away from theorizing the notion of anxiety itself, contemporary liberal philosophical and religious thinkers have given up a
powerful methodological concept, one with the capacity to provide vital
support to liberal norms.
There are challenges associated with attempting to use ‘anxiety’ in this
way, to be sure, the foremost of which is to overcome the natural resistance
to such a use of this term because of the common association of ‘anxiety’
with negative psychological states. This is a legitimate concern, especially
given the fact that there are other terms, such as ‘humility,’ which, prima facie, may seem to bear the same relevant denotation but which do not carry
the same negative connotations in common usage. I will defer responding
to this concern fully at this point and refer the reader to the remainder
of the essay. In particular, the relationship of anxiety to humility—and I
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do believe that there is an important relationship here—will be taken up
explicitly in the second and third sections below. However, I will at this
point oﬀer one very general historical rationale for attempting to resurrect
the sort of explicitly epistemic use of anxiety that I am referencing here.
The anxiety about their own fallibility as human beings that gradually
emerged among a significant portion of the literate public in the west during the modern period was one important element in the development,
evolution, and survival of political liberalism. This idea is closely connected, but not reducible, to the commonplace historical claim that liberalism
emerged out of the chastening eﬀect that the European ‘wars of religion’
had on evangelical and sectarian enthusiasms. Certainly, all sections of society tired of the bloodshed that prefaced European modernity, but there
was also an anxiety that sprang most directly from the erosion of the epistemic authority of religious institutions and the historical normativity of
the biblical narrative. This is an anxiety that owed more to the persistence
of the deists than to the excesses of the Cromwellians, and its power only
increased as nineteenth-century thinkers like Darwin and Strauss further
undermined the bedrock assumptions on which religious (and other)
groups had predicated their competing claims to historical and normative
orthodoxy. And, if such epistemic anxiety was an important psychological
and social precondition for the development of pluralistic liberal norms,
then it seems reasonable to assume that its maintenance is a necessary
condition for the preservation of such norms.
Though western intellectuals have long comforted themselves with the
myth of a so-called “secular age,” the empirical evidence has never supported it. The vast majority of Americans identify, as they always have, as
religious, and the very great majority of religious Americans identify as
Christian. That does not make the United States a “Christian nation,” but
it does suggest that the potential tension between religious faith and political principles remains one of enduring concern in the US. Moreover, for
those who are both religious and liberal (in the broad and classical sense),
the continuing influence of dogmatic religious and moral claims in sociopolitical discourse suggests that we face much the same struggle against
absolutism today that our Enlightenment predecessors faced in their time.
Hence, we would do well to promote the sorts of attitudes that helped to
shape their response to this challenge (which was successful enough to
reconstitute the very nature of political society in the west).
Of course, one may object that, insofar as basic liberal values are related to respect for the ‘dignity’ or ‘sacredness’ of the human individual,
there may be other routes to authentic liberalism than that which runs
through anxiety. After all, historically speaking, ‘liberalism’ (even in its
classical sense) is a multivalent term, encompassing various related, but
diﬀerentiable, conceptions. But the question is whether each of the various
forms of ‘liberalism’ that emerged out of the Enlightenment are equally
authentic, equally steadfast in their commitments to those principles that
distinguish liberalism from more authoritarian modes of moral-political
consciousness and practice. I cannot, here, oﬀer an exhaustive survey of all
of the particular diverse forms of liberalism that sprouted from the fertile
theoretical ground of the Enlightenment. However, a very brief discussion
of the divergence of the two most historically important branches of clas-
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sical liberalism will, I think, be suﬃcient to indicate the basis for my claim
that only a liberalism that refers, in some way or another, to a sense of epistemic anxiety is, ultimately, authentic and sustainable—as well as to indicate, in a preliminary way, the relevance of this view for religious faith.
Beginning with Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,”12 political theorists have widely recognized a fundamental distinction
between the liberalism that very early took root in modern English political philosophy through the works of thinkers like Milton, Locke, and (later) Mill, and the quite diﬀerent form of liberalism that emerged in France
and Germany, through the combined influence of Rousseau and Kant (certainly there are also important diﬀerences within these groupings, but we
are here focusing on their basic epistemic stances). For our purposes, Kant
provides a perfect example of an Enlightenment liberal who arrives at a
respect for human dignity and a principle of moral autonomy through an
alternative route, one that bypasses the requirement of anxiety for which
I am arguing. Indeed, Kant, perhaps more than any other philosopher,
represents the urge to rescue some element of certainty from the jaws of
epistemic doubt.
For our purposes, Berlin’s discussion of Kant (and Rousseau) is particularly useful because it takes a teleological view, tracing the connections
between the inner logic of Kantian liberalism and the successive, illiberal,
developments in Continental political thought that followed. Critics have
observed that Berlin simplifies matters for himself by ignoring, or at least
minimizing, certain statements by Kant (and Rousseau) that do not fit
neatly into his tidy analytical distinctions and historical narrative. There is
certainly truth to this criticism. But it also, I think, misses the point. Berlin
is interested in examining the theoretical and practical consequences that
follow from various perspectives on human freedom. He adopts a broadly
evolutionary perspective with regard to Kantian liberalism, rather than offering a more complex and nuanced exegesis, because he is less concerned
with how Kant himself mediated the various tensions in his formulation
than with how these tensions played themselves out in the thought (and
practices) of those who took themselves to be following in his footsteps,
as a measure of how well suited Kant’s formulation really is to the task of
grounding support for liberal norms. Since this is also our concern here,
Berlin’s analysis is apropos. Two points should be born in mind, though.
First, the issue of whether liberalism can be adequately supported without explicit appeal to the implications of human fallibility does not map
simply onto Berlin’s famous distinction between ‘negative’ (Locke, Mill)
and ‘positive’ (Kant, Rousseau) conceptions of liberty—though we may
suspect that fallibilism fits more naturally with negative conceptions. Second, in drawing on his critique of Kant’s positive conception of liberty, I
am not endorsing Berlin’s own particular negative conception as the only
viable alternative.13
Rather than referencing human fallibility and an attendant sense of
epistemic anxiety regarding that fallibility, Kant invokes the majesty of human reason in its capacity as moral lawgiver as the basis for his validation of individual autonomy. True freedom, according to Kant, consists
in obedience to the moral law. And, although the moral law is unitary,
one and the same for all, obedience ideally arises voluntarily, through the

390

Faith and Philosophy

autonomous exercise of the individual’s practical judgment, a product of
the self-legislating function of rationality. The problem, however, is that
people do not always agree about what rationality reveals to be the proper
moral judgment in a given situation, nor even what abstract “maxims” (to
employ Kant’s terminology) ought to govern our conduct in general. But
this can only mean that not everyone is as rational as everyone else. And,
given the nature of the relationship between the faculty (and capacity) of
rationality and right belief and conduct on Kant’s view, this imbalance
presents a potential challenge to the logic of autonomy. Berlin observes:
[For] Kant and rationalists of his type . . . the limits of liberty are determined by applying the rules of ‘reason,’ which is more than the mere
generality of rules as such, and is a faculty that creates or reveals a
purpose identical in, and for, all men. In the name of reason anything
that is non-rational may be condemned, so that the various personal
aims which their individual imaginations and idiosyncrasies lead
men to pursue . . . may, at least in theory, be ruthlessly suppressed.
. . . The authority of reason and of the duties it lays upon men is identified with individual freedom, on the assumption that only rational
ends can be the ‘true’ objects of a ‘free’ man’s ‘real’ nature.14
Combine such a view of rationality with some claim of absolute authority
(be it political or spiritual), based upon some process or sign purportedly
revelatory of the imprimatur of reason (or “truth”), and one has opened
the door to the most severe abridgments of the very freedom of conscience
that Kant begins by validating.
This is certainly not to suggest that Kant’s own defense of liberal norms
was halfhearted or insincere. As Berlin is careful to acknowledge, Kant’s
intent was to shield the individual from illegitimate encroachments by
“authority,” whether political or religious, not to provide justification for
such encroachments (just as Rousseau’s intent was almost certainly to articulate a model for deliberative self-governance among mutually autonomous individuals, not a totalizing communitarianism that swallows up
the freedom of the individual in the name of the good of the ‘sovereign’
whole). Yet, as Berlin shows, despite their own best intentions, Kant’s conception of rationality and its connection to the law (both moral and civil),
in historical conjunction with Rousseau’s often naïve assumptions about
the moral and practical reliability of the regulatory expressions of the ‘general will,’ led, more or less directly, to the State-deifying conception of the
relationship between political and moral right found in the Romanticism
of Fichte and Hegel, the anti-liberal and deterministic stance of Marx’s
communism, and the totalitarian sensibilities (and, ultimately, practices)
of their political successors in both Germany and the Soviet Union.
Noting the irony in this progression, Berlin asks, “What can have led to
so strange a reversal—the transformation of Kant’s severe individualism
into something close to a pure totalitarian doctrine on the part of thinkers
some of whom claimed to be his disciples?” The answer, it seems to me,
lies precisely in Kant’s failure to link his defense of moral and political
autonomy to a recognition of human fallibility and its implications in relation to claims of authority. Kant is correct, in my view, to connect support
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for liberal norms to epistemology, but he neglects to take suﬃcient account
of human epistemic limitations in his formulation of this connection. It’s
not that respect for the dignity of the human individual qua rational agent
has no role to play in the logic of liberalism. Respect for the individual’s
capacity to reason for herself is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient, condition
in the establishment of this logic. It requires a complementary relation to
the sort of fallibilist delimitation of the claims of authority supported by
an attitude of rationalized epistemic anxiety.
Kant’s prescription that the individual never be treated merely as
a “means” but always as an “end” does not necessarily translate into a
proscription against illiberal coercion if one believes that the individual’s
salvation (be it political or spiritual) depends upon the acceptance of a
set of beliefs and practices for the validity of which one claims absolute
assurance. Under such circumstances, one may—consistently with Kant’s
principle (even if not his intent)—determine that it is crucial that the individual adopt the relevant point of view, even if coercion is required to
guarantee this outcome. Similarly, one may determine that the use of force
to prevent the dissemination of alternative beliefs and practices is required
to ensure that the individual (or community) not be led astray from the
“proper” path.
Though his intent was otherwise, Rousseau expresses the logic of such
coercion in his famous proclamation that “whoever refuses to obey the
general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body, which means
only that he will be forced to be free.”15 Fichte, then, provides the necessary bridge from republicanism to totalitarianism when he adds: “To compel men to adopt the right form of government, to impose Right on them
by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has
both the insight and the power to do so.”16
Thus, there is an historical case for the claim that ‘liberalism’ unconditioned by the moderating influence on ideological absolutism provided
by a suﬃciently robust recognition of fallibility, in the form of an attitude
of epistemic anxiety, cannot ultimately sustain itself without sliding over
into an aggressively dictatorial illiberalism. The potential authoritarianism implicit in the logic of Kant’s and Rousseau’s works gradually revealed itself in the thought of their successors and, tragically, in the form
of actual totalitarian regimes—with which the nations that had, contrarily,
adopted the liberalism of Milton, Locke, and Mill were forced to struggle,
in order to defend (among other things) the value of individual autonomy
over against the claims of the state. Kant and Rousseau surely would have
been appalled by what their “disciples” wrought, but that does not change
the (revealing) fact that it was their disciples—not Milton’s, Locke’s, and
Mill’s—who drifted to totalitarianism.
The relevance of this discussion in the context of religious belief should
be obvious. If we replace the abstract political individual with a hypothetical religious apostate or heretic, and the state with the church, then
we immediately see the consonance between Fichte’s position and those
forms of religious orthodoxism that privilege some particular (fallible)
conception of “the truth” over the right of the individual to exercise moral
and intellectual autonomy. Fichte’s pronouncement is, of course, regarded
with horror in light of the historic consequences of the adoption of this
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attitude as a principle of socio-political regulation in both Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union. Similarly, such an attitude in the context of religious
belief provokes horror in those who see the historical abuses of Christian
dogma in, for example, the Inquisition, the brutal suppression of “heretical” views in Calvin’s Geneva, or Christian missionizing in the context
of western colonialism, as profoundly immoral—and, indeed, unchristian—and who hear echoes of this attitude in the belligerent dogmatism
of contemporary fundamentalism and ultra-orthodox Catholicism. To be
sure, contemporary religious conservatives do not advocate such methods of “discipline” or conversion as were applied in the above historical
examples. But there is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the attitude of the contemporary orthodoxists and that of their religious antecedents, and it is worth remembering that the current cultural and political
consensus repudiating such methods developed in spite of the attitudes
(and eﬀorts) of past orthodoxists, not because of some internal check that
they set on themselves out of respect for the dignity of others. Historically,
the slippery slope into genuine brutality in the name of religious orthodoxy has been all too slick and the slide all too common (if not inevitable),
when religious zeal is unqualified by an acute awareness of the fallibility
of human understandings.
‘Anxiety’ as an Epistemic Virtue17
Despite the range of responses to the issue of epistemic anxiety oﬀered by
philosophers and theologians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a common tendency to understand such anxiety precisely
as a problem in need of solution. Niebuhr, for example, blames human anxiety about the limitations of finitude for the ideological impulse that leads
to absolutism in religious, moral, and political conviction. His description
of the psychology of absolutism is worth quoting at some length:
Man knows more than the immediate natural situation in which he
stands and he constantly seeks to understand his immediate situation in terms of a total situation. Yet he is unable to define the total
human situation without colouring his definition with finite perspectives drawn from his immediate situation. The realization of the
relativity of his knowledge subjects him to the peril of skepticism.
The abyss of meaninglessness yawns on the brink of all his mighty
spiritual endeavors. Therefore man is tempted to deny the limited
character of his knowledge, and the finiteness of his perspectives. He
pretends to have achieved a degree of knowledge which is beyond
the limit of finite life. This is the ‘ideological taint’ in which all human knowledge is involved and which is always something more
than mere human ignorance. It is always partly an eﬀort to hide that
ignorance by pretension.18
Thus, for Niebuhr, anxiety is not only an inescapable consequence “of the
paradox of freedom and finiteness,” but also “the internal precondition of
sin,” where ‘sin’ is understood as the illegitimate adoption of an absolutist
stance with regard to one’s own perspective, opinions, values, etc.
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Yet, as Niebuhr goes on to observe: “[A]nxiety is not sin. It must be
distinguished from sin partly because it is its precondition and not its actuality, and partly because [anxiety] is the basis of all human creativity as
well.”19 In other words, it is not the attitude of anxiousness itself but, rather, the all too human tendency to attempt to purge oneself of unwanted
anxiety, by ignoring both the feeling and its implications and indulging in
the self-delusion of epistemic privilege, that debases human consciousness
and freedom through an abandonment of responsibility (or, as Niebuhr’s
philosophical counterparts would say, ‘authenticity’). Niebuhr is right to
say that, “Anxiety is the internal description of temptation.”20 But temptation is only a natural, ineluctable concomitant of moral freedom. To be
morally free is, by definition, to be tempted. Temptation is not, in itself, an
evil. To the contrary, it is the precondition of all moral achievement—one
cannot laud the right choices of angels, for they are no choices at all.21
Accordingly, Niebuhr speaks of ‘faith’ not as a means to purge the individual of anxiety but, rather, as a means to “purge anxiety of the tendency toward sinful self-assertion.”22 Thus, he raises the possibility of an
unproblematic, even empowering, form of anxiety. Drawing on Kierkegaard’s suggestive references to “‘anxiety over nothing’—that pregnant
anxiety that is directed toward the future and that is a pristine element in
every human being,”23 Niebuhr describes this positive form of anxiety as
the psychological ground of human creativity. Niebuhr calls such creative
anxiety ‘anxiety about perfection,’ which he contrasts to the more insidious ‘anxiety about insecurity.’24 Anxiety about perfection is occasioned not
by fear of uncertainty but, instead, by the desire to push one’s understandings and creative accomplishments ever forward, to further the bounds
of one’s knowledge in the face of the seemingly limitless possibilities presented by human experience and activity.25
Niebuhr claims, however, that “Anxiety about perfection and about
insecurity are . . . inexorably bound together in human actions and the
errors which are made in the search for perfection are never due merely
to the ignorance of not knowing the limits of conditioned values. They
always exhibit some tendency of the agent to hide his own limits, which
he knows only too well.”26 And this is surely true. But the fact that no human can achieve a perfectly unadulterated embodiment of the virtuous
form of anxiety does not make such anxiety any less virtuous in character,
nor should it keep us from encouraging the individual to cultivate the
virtue of a more perfected, less adulterated anxiety. It is common to virtues
that they exhibit within themselves the potentiality for vice, when they
are taken to extremes, or aimed in the wrong direction. Thus, thrift may
become greed or acquisitiveness, confidence may become pride, openmindedness may become licentiousness, etc. Moreover, as already discussed, it is not ‘anxiety about insecurity’ itself that constitutes the error of
unqualified absolutism but, rather, the reaction against such anxiety in the
adoption of a dogmatic consciousness.27
Again, all human beings are necessarily fallible. Thus, fallibility is an
epistemic condition of humanity as such, but, like other epistemic conditions, it can be ignored (at least at a conscious level). Anxiety, on the other
hand, is both a condition of human existence (a universal one, according
to Kierkegaard and his successors) and a response to such existence. As a
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condition, anxiety represents a central element in what was once called
‘philosophical anthropology’: the elucidation of the fundamental conditions of human nature and existence, both ontic and epistemic. But its
status as such a condition is derivative from its status as a (universal) response to the (definitive) condition of fallibility in which each human being finds herself, qua human being.28 And, it seems to me, to the extent that
anxiety about fallibility causes one to adopt a more generally circumspect
point of view, it is a virtuous response. For it is only in the acceptance
of some level of ultimate insecurity—some fundamental preservation of
anxiety within the context of committed belief—that one can overcome the
temptation to deify one’s understandings. Only thus can one act on one’s
own convictions always in such a manner as to respect the right of others
to hold and act according to contrary convictions. Hence, an appropriately
moderated, but consciously sustained, sense of epistemic anxiety should
be viewed as a sign of intellectual and psychological maturity. Indeed,
my claim is that such anxiety represents the central epistemic virtue bequeathed (unintentionally) to contemporary democratic society and theory by our Enlightenment predecessors and that this epistemic virtue can
help to support and sustain moral, religious, and political virtues, such as
humility and tolerance.
An underlying and permanent sense of epistemic anxiety among a
democratic citizenry is a socially and politically healthy thing, precisely
because it serves to maintain citizens’ acknowledgement of their own fallibility (both as individuals and as members of religious and other groups)
and, thereby, discourages the sort of illegitimate absolutist and exclusivistic attitudes that tend to undermine the reasonability and productivity of
democratic discourses. While an overly anxious attitude regarding one’s
beliefs can lead to an undesirable moral and political paralysis (or an overly reactionary assertion of supposed “certainty” meant to mask the deeper
sense of insecurity), an appropriately moderated and rationalized attitude
of anxiety can go far in promoting other democratic virtues, such as intellectual curiosity, cooperativeness and a willingness to compromise, and
genuine tolerance of others’ beliefs and lifestyles.
Moreover, anxiety, in the sense just outlined, represents a powerful,
and in some ways less problematic, alternative to the notion of ‘tolerance’
as the organizing virtue in discussions of the basis of democratic norms.
The notion of tolerance has frequently been criticized as seeming to imply
an attitude of mere grudging agreement to coexist. Simply to ‘tolerate’
another in no way obligates one to attempt more fully to understand the
other’s perspective or beliefs, nor does it compel one to question the supposed certainty of one’s own views. Tolerance, as a mode of engagement
with others, can signal just as stalemated and stagnant a conversation as
does intolerance. Reasonable anxiety regarding one’s own positions, on
the other hand, does obligate one to attempt more fully to understand
and more fairly to assess alternative positions. And this is so precisely
because anxiety, unlike tolerance, is an explicitly epistemic, and not
merely a moral-political virtue. Insofar as a reasonable sense of anxiety
about one’s own epistemic limitations promotes an acknowledgement of
the provisionality and revisability of one’s opinions, one is encouraged
to take democratic discourse seriously, as a cooperative (and relatively
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non-coercive) mode of inquiry, will-formation, and action. Democratic legal prohibitions against prejudice and forced social or moral conformism
gain a normative force that is absent when one is merely constrained by
law to “tolerate” those whom one is, nevertheless, “certain” are wrong.29
In short, a reasonable level of mutually sustained anxiety among citizens
regarding their respective beliefs and opinions is the precondition for a
democratic society of good-faith.
To be clear, my point here is not that anxiety should wholly displace
tolerance from discussions of liberal norms. Rather, I am proposing that
epistemic anxiety provides the necessary normative warrant for liberal
norms such as tolerance. The logic of my argument is straightforward:
Fallibility is an inescapable condition of human experience and understanding. The proper response to this condition is the adoption of a stance
of epistemic anxiety (as I am here defining that term), because an unqualified confidence in one’s own beliefs—in spite of the recognition of fallibility—would represent a failure adequately to account for the truth of
one’s fallibility in the formation of one’s beliefs (and one’s attitude towards
them). Furthermore, classical liberalism represents the proper sociopolitical
instantiation of epistemic anxiety, because the norm of non-coercion that it
propagates is the procedural manifestation of such anxiety in the context
of interpersonal action. To deny the liberal principle of non-coercion in
the face of human fallibility is to willfully evade the epistemic anxiety
that naturally attaches itself to human subjectivity by virtue of its finitude
and fallen-ness. And to express such an evasion is to idolatrously deify
one’s own understanding and to violate the sacredness of other human
beings’ moral and intellectual autonomy through an expression of a selfvalidating “will to power” masquerading as a righteous concern for the
salvation of those who are coerced.
The Phenomenology of Epistemic Anxiety
So far, I have characterized the particular notion of anxiety upon which
my argument is predicated in terms of a conscious acknowledgement of
the intrinsic fallibility of human understanding (especially one’s own). In
order further to clarify precisely what I mean by ‘anxiety,’ it will be helpful to contrast my use of this term with certain other, somewhat related,
usages of the same word.
First, as should be obvious at this point, the form of anxiety that I have
in mind must be distinguished from the common, everyday sense of the
word, referring to mental stress or tension associated with some negatively anticipated event, challenge, or trial, as well as the related clinical
sense of the word, referring to some form of persistent, neurotic attitude
associated with some—real or imaginary—object of dread. Both of these
types of anxiety can lead to precisely the sort of hardening of sentiment
and opinion—as a reaction against the feelings of uncertainty they represent—that I wish to discourage. Just as Kierkegaard and his existentialist
successors are careful to distinguish anxiety from ‘fear,’30 the former must
similarly be distinguished from nervousness. To be ‘anxious’ about one’s
epistemic limitations as a finite being is to be self-consciously aware of
one’s existential situation and motivated to account for it adequately in
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one’s beliefs, claims, and behavior. To be ‘nervous’ about these limitations
is to neurotically react to them in a way that, paradoxically, denies their
inescapability, because such a reaction inevitably leads one either to seek
succor in the false comfort of an absolutist mentality (that seems to erase,
but in fact merely represses, the unpleasant insecurity from which one
takes flight) or to embrace despair, indiﬀerence, and nihilism.
On the other hand, when it is associated with some particular issue
of policy or social or ethical concern, the common, non-clinical variety
of emotional anxiety can sometimes motivate people to open up to an
exchange of ideas aimed at solving some problem or formulating some
course of action. George Marcus has discussed the political psychology of
such deliberation-inducing anxiety in The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in
Democratic Politics.31 According to Marcus, citizens tend to think and act
according to habituated patterns of behavior except when some unanticipated or novel stimulus triggers the emotional response of ‘anxiety’ about
how to think and/or act in light of this new datum or question. Marcus
claims that only such visceral, stimulus-specific anxiety provokes the engagement of the subject’s rational capacities, motivating the ‘anxious’ subject to employ her deliberative consciousness to come to some resolution
of the problem or question at hand and, thereby, alleviate her anxiety.32
“Reason,” he says, “does not come from reason’s own prompting.”33
There are some problems with Marcus’s account of the role of anxiety
and deliberation in the democratic sphere, however. First, he makes ordinary citizens overly dependent upon political elites, such as members of
government and the media, who are given almost sole responsibility for
recognizing emerging problems and issues and employing emotive rhetoric in order to inspire the requisite anxiety among the people at-large.34
This is a problem precisely because, in a democratic society, it is ultimately
the underlying attitudes and inclinations of the demos itself that are reflected in the choices that politicians and the media make about what sorts
of discussions to have and how to portray those discussions to the public.
If the public doesn’t maintain a constant sense of engagement with emerging issues, then they will not demand, nor will politicians and media outlets provide, the sort of discourse that promotes genuinely democratic and
deliberative decision-making.
Also, Marcus seems not only to invest too great a trust in political elites
not to abuse the power of anxiety provoking rhetoric, but also too readily
to assume that the mobilization of public anxiety will, more often than
not, lead to reasoned discourse, as opposed to reactionism and narrowed
sentiment and imagination. This problem is directly related to the previous one: a populace that is accustomed to maintaining a reasonable level of
deliberation-inducing anxiety at all times will be less likely to fall prey to
waves of irrational anxiety associated with specific socially or politically
traumatic or revolutionary events or circumstances.35
Finally, Marcus’s account of anxiety remains superficial precisely because he views anxiety only as an emotive state, without significant or coherent cognitive content—part of the “unaware and inarticulate” realm of
emotional response, which he sharply divides from conscious thought.36
Hence, he is unable to appreciate the cognitive significance of anxiety as
an intellectual, and not merely an emotional, state or response. Nor is he
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able to formulate the possibility of a systematic (or methodological) anxiety that permanently maintains the engagement of deliberative openness
by permanently maintaining a sense of anxiety associated with the absence of both ultimate certitude and static socio-political equilibrium.
Nevertheless, as a description of the psychological connection between
the emotional component of anxiety and its intellectual, moral, religious,
and political implications, Marcus’s account can provide a first step toward a deeper phenomenology of the more thoroughgoing epistemic anxiety I am advocating.37 In a sense, one might view such epistemic anxiety
as a systematic intellectual and practical generalization of the mindset of
deliberative openness that Marcus describes as the ideal outcome of issuespecific anxiety. The transient emotive state of anxiety that he describes
can represent the psychological precursor to the adoption of the deeper,
permanent epistemic anxiety of the self-reflective democrat, but only insofar as this transient state of uncertainty and deliberative engagement is
consciously detached from, and generalized beyond, the provoking stimulus in relation to which it arises. The feeling of anxiety must be intellectually internalized and transformed into an explicit awareness of one’s own,
and others’, intrinsic fallibility.
Obviously, one who adopts a stance of epistemic anxiety will, at times,
experience the psychological correlate of emotional anxiety. Yet, such emotionally weighted anxiety must not take on an urgency that contravenes
the impulse to remain open to dialogue. Nor should it sink into a morbidity that relinquishes deliberation for despair. Indeed, it is important to note
the diﬀerence between ‘anxiety’ and ‘despair,’ where the latter indicates
not merely a recognition of human fallibility but also an abandonment of
the ideals of objective rationality and truth that are presupposed by deliberation as such. This is the point at which the present defense of epistemic
anxiety departs most sharply from the existentialist tradition it references.
The anxiety that I am advocating here does not presuppose the dissolution
of the idea of objective reasons (or even values). It recognizes our character
as self-defining beings who make choices about what to believe, choices
that are limited by our own finitude and that are, therefore, fallible. And
it acknowledges that it can be “anguishing to know that our freedom is so
far-reaching as to leave our existence permanently unsettled in this way.”38
But it need not go so far as to pronounce, as the existentialists typically do,
that there is no source of values that transcends finite human understandings and to which such understandings can legitimately make reference.
It is no less ‘authentic’ to believe, wholeheartedly, that one has apprehended some objective truth about the human condition or right conduct
but, in recognition of one’s own fallibility, to avoid any imposition of one’s
view onto others, than it is to toss aside the notion of moral objectivity
entirely and simply “own” one’s choices as though they made reference
to nothing outside of the arbitrary (or perhaps anthropologically imposed) conditions of one’s own will. One need not accept Sartre’s claim
that “nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value,”39 in order to be true to the insight that one’s choices among
possible values or actions may be flawed or incomplete, or may (at least
in some cases) have equally valid alternatives. Mauvaise foi is expressed
in claims such as that one could not possibly be mistaken in one’s belief
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about ‘x,’ or that one’s belief about ‘x’ is exempted somehow from the normal rules of reason and evidence, or that some beliefs are epistemically
privileged, or that some interpretation of a text is self-evidently ‘inerrant.’
There is no bad faith or self-deception in the claim that one holds firmly
to certain beliefs or accepts certain interpretations for reasons that seem
to transcend the caprice of mere self-definition, uninformed by objective
reference, if one simultaneously acknowledges the possibility that one is
mistaken about these reasons. So long as one abstains from leveling unqualified judgments at those with whom one disagrees, or trying to force
them to submit to one’s view irrespective of their own wishes and beliefs,
and remains open to being persuaded otherwise, there is no illegitimate
flight from anxiety.
Kierkegaard sees the embodiment of authentically lived anxiety in the
person of Socrates,40 who remains in a permanent state of epistemic anxiety precisely because he—unlike Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’—refuses
to make the subjective leap into ‘the absurd.’ Instead, Socrates relentlessly confronts the limits of his own understanding, while simultaneously
bursting the epistemic bubbles of his various interlocutors. Socrates’ wisdom lies in his consistent awareness of his own “ignorance,” and his generalization of this awareness as an epistemic principle that leads him to
be suspicious of all unqualified knowledge claims and to compulsively
pursue deliberative debate with others. Such wisdom, or “Socratic ignorance,”41 as Kierkegaard calls it, does not preclude personal commitment.
Indeed, Socrates is willing to die for his beliefs. But what Socrates would
presumably not be willing to do is to take the life (or infringe illegitimately on the freedom) of another in order to promote his own beliefs. Socratic
anxiety, as I would now like to call it, requires circumspection and humility, but not indecision or paralysis.
Hume—who consistently recognized the imperatives of belief and action, in the face of his own skeptical doubts about human understanding—
beautifully characterizes the attitude and practical implications associated
with Socratic anxiety in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.42 At one
point, his skeptical character Philo responds to the charge that skepticism,
like stoicism, represents a philosophy that can be entertained at an intellectual level but that is impossible to live out in a truly consistent manner.
Philo replies:
I allow of your comparison between the Stoics and the Skeptics. . . .
But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot,
in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even when
it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and
the eﬀects of the Stoic’s reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. . . . In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to skeptical considerations on
the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his
philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say, in his common conduct, he will be found diﬀerent from those who either never
formed any opinions in the case or have entertained sentiments more
favorable to human reason.43
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I have no intention to equate Socratic anxiety with outright ‘skepticism,’
and I, for one, certainly do entertain “sentiments more favorable to human
reason” than those, at times, expostulated by Hume. Yet, as a committed
democrat, I find his description of a mode of reasoning and living that is
chastened by a recognition of one’s own (and everyone else’s) ultimate fallibility very appealing.
I, personally, do believe that human understanding can claim some
genuinely objective knowledge of the world as it is independently of our
own mental-linguistic constructions—even if this knowledge can only be
expressed through the employment of such constructions. I also believe that
there are certain logically necessary, a priori truths, such as that expressed
by the ‘law of non-contradiction.’ But there is no obviously correct, no
‘self-evident,’ set of moral regulations or judgments that can simply be
deduced from such knowledge with unambiguous certitude. (Nor is there
any legitimate shortcut around fallibility through the arbitrary epistemic
privileging of certain ‘scriptures’ or other supposed repositories of infallible wisdom.) While I have strong opinions about many issues, and may
even feel at times that I cannot understand how any reasonable person
could disagree with certain propositions, I always know that equally reasonable people do in fact disagree over even the most fundamental moral,
religious, and political issues (which, of course, is not to say that all positions in any such dispute are equally reasonable44).
Given the acknowledgement that it is, in principle, always possible that
I am the one who is mistaken, even regarding my most deeply held beliefs,
I cannot legitimately claim the right to coerce others to believe as I do. Nor
can I—in the absence of some voluntary agreement to the contrary—claim
the right to force them to act in accordance with my principles rather than
their own. Of course, this position need not imply pacifism, and it certainly does not imply anarchism. Indeed, one of my central points is precisely
that the recognition of human fallibility that is represented by this doctrine of anxiety has normative implications at a meta-political level, implications such as that the use of force or coercive power may be employed
to prevent others from violating the freedom of their fellow human beings
out of some misguided sense of epistemic or moral superiority. Anxiety
about fallibility would have been a good reason for the nineteeth- and
twentieth-century struggles against slavery and fascism, for example, not
a reason to have tolerated such practices.
Hume (through Philo) continues, in the same passage quoted above, to
remark: “To whatever length anyone may push his speculative principles
of skepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men;
and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason than the
absolute necessity he lies under of so doing.”45 Since the bearer of Socratic
anxiety is not necessarily quite so pessimistic about human reason as the
Humean skeptic, “the absolute necessity” to act, live, and, especially, converse may be understood by the Socratic liberal not as an arbitrary and
imposed requirement of human existence but, rather, as a valuable epistemic compensation. Yes, we are thrust into a world that showers us with
data while limiting the perspective from which we apprehend it. But we
are not thrust into this world alone. We have the company of others, who
likewise perceive the world from limited perspectives, but perspectives
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not our own. And our diﬀering perspectives oﬀer opportunities for correlation and contrast, for verification and falsification—or at least concurrence or challenge.46 Thus, we stand also under the obligation (not “absolute” but normative) to condition our belief with humility—for humility
is one fundamental moral and religious virtue that follows directly from
the epistemic virtue of anxiety.
We can and should advocate our respective views. We must argue. And
we’ve every right to attempt through all legitimate means to persuade.
But we cannot arrogate to ourselves the right to coerce (at least not outside
of the legitimate coercive requirements of democratic decision-making
procedures). For in doing so we deify our own, decidedly non-divine and
finite, understandings. The phenomenology of epistemic, or Socratic, anxiety encompasses various levels, from the emotive to the intellectual, and
it has both methodological and practical implications. In practical terms,
though, it boils down to a genuine respect for disagreement; a principled
preference for substantive dialogue as a means of decision-making; an affirmation of compromise over unilateralism in moral, social, and political
aﬀairs; and a strong reluctance to call upon force to reshape circumstance
before all other viable options have been exhausted.
Anxiety and Tolerance
The idea that genuinely recognizing human fallibility requires allowing
the free exchange of ideas, respect for others’ opinions, and remaining
open to the possibility that one is mistaken is hardly revolutionary. It was
revolutionary when Milton put it forward in his Areopagitica,47 and again
when Locke reiterated the theme in his Letter Concerning Toleration.48 And
it was less revolutionary but importantly expanded and clarified when
Mill championed it in On Liberty.49 But Milton could not—because of his
own religious commitments—take his argument to its logical conclusion,
and he ends up with a significant residue of epistemic privilege in his
stance towards the truth claims of (Protestant) Christianity, a residue that
survives in Locke. Mill’s theorization of fallibility (largely) achieves the
consistency that Milton and Locke failed to realize. But Mill himself sets
the stage for the methodological transition away from theorized fallibility
by following Locke in turning immediately to the notion of ‘tolerance’ as
the moral-political virtue non plus ultra of political liberalism.50
The problem with tolerance, from a non-liberal perspective, is that theoretically it is presented as a sort of meta-virtue that ought to transcend all
various substantive points-of-view, but practically it presents itself as an
externally imposed mandate that is inconsistent with the prescriptions of
some substantive points-of-view. In other words, the claim that tolerance
represents a perspective-neutral principle of rational discourse is challenged on the grounds that tolerance conflicts with certain religious and
moral conceptions that stress the need for universal adherence to some set
of epistemically privileged doctrines. Hence, the issue is often treated as
a conflict between the civic virtue of tolerance and the religious virtue of
‘faith.’ But, as the preceding discussion of epistemic anxiety suggests, this
strictly polemical view of the relation between liberal tolerance and religious faith rests on fundamental misconceptions of each of these notions.
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In his classic work on the relationship between faith and knowledge in
religious belief, the contemporary philosopher of religion John Hick observes that, “According to the most widespread view of the matter today
faith is unevidenced or inadequately evidenced belief.” He then goes on
to add:
Faith thus consists in believing strongly various propositions, of a
theological nature, which the believer does not and cannot know to
be true. To know here is taken to mean either to observe directly or
to be able to prove by strict determination. Where this is possible,
there is no room for faith. It is only that which lies beyond the scope
of human knowledge that must be taken, if at all, on faith or trust.
When in such a case we do adopt some belief, the lack of rational
compulsion to assent is compensated by an act of will, a voluntary
leap of trust.51
The problem with this view lies in the qualification expressed in the first
line of the quote: “of a theological nature.” This implies that ‘faith’ is not
an element in decisions about what to believe in other arenas. In other
words, this formulation assumes that in all of the non-theological realms
of human inquiry and belief it is possible always (or at least very often)
to “observe directly or . . . to prove by strict determination.” Furthermore,
this view assumes that it is generally the case in non-theological matters
that interpretations of that which is “observe[d] directly” and outcomes
of “strict” proofs are uncontroversial, because there is a “rational compulsion to assent.” But is this the case?
To be sure, it sometimes seems to me that the evidence or arguments
regarding some issue so strongly support one view of the matter that I feel
rationally compelled to assent to that view. Yet, almost invariably there is
someone else—someone whom I would not be willing to simply dismiss
as “irrational”—who disagrees. Moreover, even in the most ‘objective’
(and I do not mean to belittle this term) fields of inquiry, it is often simply
not possible to directly observe or strictly demonstrate the answer to questions of real significance. This does not mean that thought shuts down
in the face of such uncertainty. Inquiry, like life, must proceed in the absence of final certainty. Thus, science, very much like religion, proceeds in
agreement where agreement is possible, and it is the backdrop of general
agreement that allows for the pursuit of those points about which no such
agreement exists, sometimes leading to discoveries or new theories that
destabilize or demolish the prior consensus from which they proceeded.
This is the pragmatic-evolutionary character of scientific inquiry, and of
life in general.
Thus, ‘faith’ is present in all aspects of human understanding.52 To be
clear, I do not deny that there is a significant diﬀerence in the degree of
faith required to aﬃrm, say, the basic principles of the theory of natural
selection, as opposed to the claim that the Nicene Trinitarian formula expresses some fundamental truth about ultimate reality. The latter certainly
rests on a thinner evidential foundation. I am simply denying that there
is a categorical diﬀerence between the two. That is not to say that there are
not generally reasons to believe in one way rather than another. But such
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reasons rarely, if ever, “compel assent”53 for everyone who encounters
them—and those who believe that they do may be mistaken. The failure
to recognize that thought and action always depend on some degree of
faith that one has seen things rightly not only encourages non-religious
people to unjustifiably disdain the notion of religious faith per se, but also
encourages many religious people themselves to accept the notion that
the objects of belief relevant to their religious lives lie “beyond the scope
of human knowledge” and are, therefore, exempt from the normal rules
of evidence. Strict fideism makes no sense if questions such as “Is this text
demonstrably the ‘Word of God’?” are in fact open to some measure of
rational adjudication.
The putative uniqueness of religious belief, as being a matter of faith,
provides support for the traditionalist (monotheistic) religious notion that
faith is a mysterious, divinely-bestowed third element standing between
the believing subject and the object of belief, encouraging some ‘believers’
to view the ‘unbelief’ (notice, not ‘alternative belief’) of others as a product
(and sign) of the latter’s moral degeneracy or spiritual deficiency, rather
than simply a matter of intellectual disagreement over an issue on which
it is possible for reasonable people to disagree. This misconception further obscures the too little discussed resources for combating absolutism
that exist within religious traditions, like Christianity, in which the urge
to absolutism has been historically pronounced.54 Such intolerant believers embrace what we may call Calvin’s contradiction, after the theologian
who, perhaps, most brazenly weds the notions of religious certainty and
textual and interpretive ‘inerrancy’ with the directly contradictory notion
of humanity’s moral and epistemic ‘fallenness.’55 Calvin’s steadfast refusal
to consider the implications of his view of human ‘depravity’ for his own
claims regarding the nature and meaning of ‘scripture’ has conditioned
Protestant belief ever since, setting the stage for the flight from anxiety
that has helped to push the self-satisfied certainty of many Christians in
tragically (and sinfully) aggressive and intolerant directions.
Indeed, this all too common propensity to circumscribe the epistemic
implications of finitude within the bounds of an absolutist and exclusivistic religious understanding represents one important reason why the
traditional virtue of ‘humility’ cannot play the role I am ascribing here to
anxiety. Humility, like tolerance, is a religious, moral, and political virtue,
not an epistemic one. Humility certainly can be connected to the epistemic
conditions of finitude, and, yet, one need not genuinely recognize these
conditions in order to aﬃrm humility as a virtue. Many religious absolutists acknowledge the rightness of a humble attitude, but they envision
such humility as part and parcel of their fideism. From this perspective,
one has humility towards God, not towards one’s own beliefs about God.
Perhaps one also is encouraged to remain humble in one’s relations to
other humans, but, again, this is encouraged as a requirement of, but not
with respect to, one’s religious and moral convictions. It was not humility
but, rather, anxiety that helped provoke the modern west’s move towards
liberalism. The relationship of anxiety to humility is not one of equivalence, it is one in which the former grounds the latter more deeply.56
The notion of epistemic anxiety stands as a corrective to the tendency
among many religious believers to conveniently ignore the implications of
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human finitude for religious belief. Fundamentalism is idolatry. This is a
language that will strike closer to home for many who are not persuaded
by the notion of tolerance. The same people who most vociferously hurl
the charge of “playing God” at those who extend their technological reach
beyond what the former think appropriate are those most often guilty of
playing God epistemically, of deifying their own finite, fallible understandings. And this argument leaves little room for strong rebuttal. Even the most
conservative traditionalist will not be so brazen as to claim infallibility. Of
course, they will claim it on behalf of some person or group of persons
portrayed in their religious tradition (e.g., Jesus and the biblical authors),
but even setting aside the a priori argument from finitude and granting,
hypothetically, the possibility that some person(s) might have possessed
infallibility, the problem remains that only another infallible person could
inerrantly recognize the infallibility of the first. And no religious tradition
of which I am aware licenses such a claim by the practitioner.57
At this point, some readers may object that there is an apparent paradox
or self-contradiction implicit in my account of epistemic anxiety and/or in
the general liberal principle of non-coercion that I seek to justify through
this account. Such an objection might take several diﬀerent forms: First,
there is a formal conception of the (putative) paradox that is as old as the
liberalism it is meant to counter. This version of the objection claims that
the principle of non-coercion is, if enforced, self-violating, because it requires (or may require) the employment of coercive means in order to prevent actions58 that are judged to be contradictory to or inconsistent with the
principle—e.g., the use of federal law enforcement powers to ensure compliance with civil rights statutes and judicial determinations at state and
local levels. Traditionally, liberal theorists have responded to this criticism
by drawing a distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ norms
and by arguing that liberal political regulation is purely procedural—and,
therefore, substantively ‘neutral’—in character.59
Thus, the liberal prohibition against coercion is viewed as categorically
diﬀerent in character from any substantive belief or principle of action
that might be enforced contrary to such a prohibition. And this diﬀerence
stems, in part, from the fact that liberalism leaves untouched the individual’s right and capacity to believe and personally to act upon whatever
beliefs she may acquire (through whatever relevant process of belief formation one might identify), so long as she does not violate others’ right to
this same freedom. Hence, the validity of the enforcement of liberal norms
is connected to the ineluctable, pragmatic exigencies of social life.60
Human beings must socialize across ideological lines,61 and the only
way to do so without enduring endless cycles of violent conflict or arbitrary oppression of some individuals or groups by others is to adopt
procedural regulations regarding such socialization that mutually maximize the respective rights to substantive freedom of all members of society. But such mutual maximization of rights requires the minimization of
the capacity of any particular substantive viewpoint to intrude upon any
other. While it is true that the latter form of regulation limits the former (at
least for those perspectives that validate intrusiveness), it does so of necessity, and, thus, the complaint against it is what Berlin would call a mere
“counsel of perfection.” Every perspective is limited in the same way, and
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none more so than any other—and this includes the liberal perspective,
which is uniquely self-limiting (see below). Furthermore, as Charles Larmore rightly observes: “If just laws serve to check the arbitrary will of
others, their impact on our conduct and the prohibitions they impose do
not amount in themselves to a reduction in our freedom. By doing away
with our vulnerability, they bring into existence a realm of freedom that
we would not otherwise have.”62
Alternatively, one might object that my aﬃrmation of the principle of
human fallibility, upon which my conception of epistemic anxiety—and,
therefore, my formulation of the basis of the principle of non-coercion and
other liberal norms—is based, is self-refuting, because such an assertion
of fallibility itself is subject to doubt on its own grounds. In other words,
my claim that all human understanding is fallible is also, on its own logic,
fallible and, therefore, dubitable. But does this really represent a paradox or self-contradiction? I do not think so, because ‘fallible’ is not the
same as ‘false.’ I can perfectly well admit that my own conception of human fallibility is, itself, fallible, while maintaining my conviction that it
is, also, true. Indeed, this is the only self-consistent manner in which I can
maintain this conviction. I am simply admitting that it is possible that I’m
wrong about all of this. That doesn’t mean that I am wrong. Possibility is
not actuality.
This particular possibility does have normative implications, however,
which is precisely why, as I noted earlier, I (and other liberals of my type)
stop short of seeking to coercively disabuse others of their own absolutist
perspectives. As I just discussed above, the claims of liberalism are inextricably linked to the conditions (and necessities) of social life. The enforcement of liberal norms supported by my conception of human fallibility and
epistemic anxiety is—consistently with its own logic—self-limiting as well
as regulatory. That is, the regulatory reach of this conception of the normativity of liberal norms is limited by its own internal check on the claims
of authority, including its own authority. Obviously, this is not to say that
I will not attempt by all appropriate means of persuasion to convince others that absolutist understandings are inherently flawed and pernicious,
just as I expect that they will attempt to convince me otherwise. I value
such dialogue precisely because of my recognition of my own fallibility
(indeed, that is the point). Moreover, my obligatory aﬃrmation of the fallibility of my own view is the reason why I have deployed various arguments to support my claim regarding the ineluctability of human fallibility vis-à-vis religious beliefs. If I could somehow infallibly prove human
fallibility (now, there would be a paradox), then such arguments would be
superfluous (and, in the case of the example just given, mistaken).
Finally, one might formulate the objection substantively, rather than formally, by challenging the logic of epistemic anxiety in relation to the very
dynamics of belief. This form of the objection might proceed thus: Imagine
that I hold a set of beliefs that, among other things, implies that I have an
obligation to enforce a particular doctrinal orthodoxy by preventing the
dissemination of heretical views and, if necessary, to do so coercively. Further, assume that this set of beliefs is at least prima facie rational, because it is
based upon my considered assessment of the relevant evidence. The foregoing account of the normative implications of epistemic anxiety appears,
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in this case, to require that, given any doubt whatsoever regarding the certainty of my beliefs in general, I must reject as false a specific belief that
currently I hold as true upon the basis of the preponderance of evidence as
I construe it. This seems to be a paradoxical conclusion (and, perhaps, an
impossible requirement in practice, given the often involuntary character
of belief formation as a function of evidential consideration).
But this objection misconstrues the relationship of epistemic anxiety to
the dynamic of belief that informs our hypothetical orthodoxist’s conviction. My point is that human fallibility itself is an ineluctable element in the
body of evidence that our erstwhile believer must consider in forming her
beliefs in the first place. In other words, epistemic anxiety does not require
that she paradoxically find false a belief that she heretofore held to be true
on reasonable grounds; rather, it calls into question the assumed reasonableness of her belief that she is justified in approaching others coercively because
such a belief necessarily ignores the epistemic implications of the fact of
human fallibility (and it is worth emphasizing that my claim is limited to
her belief in her right of coercion; she may, on my view, continue reasonably to have faith in her overall belief system, despite her recognition of
its fallibility, since there can be no rational obligation to eschew substantive belief in general—because “ought implies can”). Thus, the normative
connection between fallibility and anxiety, and, in turn, between anxiety
and liberalism, is founded on the very rational obligation to consider all
relevant and available evidence in the formation of one’s beliefs to which
this objection refers.
Now, one might attempt to avoid this implication for religious belief by
admitting that fallibility is, indeed, an ineluctable condition of human nature and, therefore, a significant evidential factor that must be considered
in the formation of rational belief but, also, claiming that revelation—when
added into the mix of evidential support for a certain set of beliefs—can
override the normative implication of fallibility by providing a touchstone of certainty that trumps all reasonable doubt. But, as I have already
shown, this position involves a vicious regress, because any claim to an
infallible, revelatory understanding could only be inerrantly identified as
such by one who was, already, also infallible (and therefore without need
of such a revelation, in any case).
The same logic obviously holds, mutatis mutandis, for any revelatory
text, act, etc. Indeed, with things like texts and acts, the problem is compounded by issues of interpretation.63 Hence, appeals to revelatory knowledge can validate the claims of faith only when that faith is conditioned by
an acceptance of the fallibility of the very “knowledge” provided by (and
deciphered from) the revelation(s) in question—that is, only when that
faith embraces the virtue of epistemic anxiety.
Nor will it do to admit that human fallibility must be considered as one
element in the evidential mix but claim that a consideration of the whole
of the evidence might still, legitimately, lead one to aﬃrm an orthodoxist
position (if that implies a willingness to coerce others to think as one does
or to force them to act in accordance with an ideology they do not share).
The implications of acknowledging one’s own fallibility must be viewed
categorically, not as a matter of degree, in relation to one’s interactions with
others. For there is a categorical diﬀerence, morally speaking, between
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voluntarily adopting and adhering to a perspective or ideology on the
basis of one’s own fallible construal of the evidence for and against it and
forcing someone else to adopt and/or adhere to it contrarily to her own
judgment on the matter. It is one thing, to take a currently prominent example, for an individual to suppress and refrain from acting upon her
own homosexual tendencies on the basis of her commitment to a religious
perspective that proscribes them. It is quite another thing for her and other members of her religious community to seek coercively to impose the
same proscription on others.
This is the point at which epistemic anxiety connects with respect for
the dignity of the individual. As I indicated in my discussion of Kant, liberalism certainly depends upon such respect, but it also depends—crucially, I think—on the recognition that respecting human dignity requires
respecting the right of others to construct, and live in accordance with,
diverse conceptions of what contributes to and what derogates from that
dignity. And, I submit, it is epistemic anxiety, as I have formulated it here,
that produces and supports this further recognition. If one could know
infallibly that one’s own perspective on any matter of moral judgment were
correct, then such knowledge would (at least arguably) override the moral
distinction between adopting the requirements of this perspective for oneself and imposing them on others. Without such a guarantee, however,
one must respect the right of others to adopt contrary perspectives as a
matter of highest principle.
Therefore, tolerance is not an “externally imposed mandate” that stifles
the spirit of religious belief by holding in check its naturally evangelical
impulse. Rather, it is an internal requirement of the logic of the religious
mentality, which is founded upon the recognition of humanity’s inadequacy in the face of forces and questions that are larger than us, holding
in check what Niebuhr calls “the tendency toward sinful self-assertion.”
Thus, true religious faith does not imply a ‘teleological suspension of the
ethical,’64 nor, for that matter, the liberal. For such faith—insofar as it makes
even implicit reference to the distinction between the infinitude of its object and the finitude of its subject—necessarily includes recognition of the
inadequacy of the individual’s understandings and, therefore, prohibits
dogmatically motivated action that transgresses contractual ethical norms
and freedoms. In other words, genuinely self-reflective faith in something
that is believed to transcend the human, eo ipso, implies the normativity of
liberal norms, like tolerance.
Tolerance is not the foundational virtue of liberalism. Tolerance is derivative from anxiety, psychologically, historically, and theoretically.65
Anxiety about the limitations of one’s own understanding—an inescapable byproduct of the erosion of appeals to epistemic privilege that helps
define the Enlightenment mentality—is the true sine qua non of liberal
democratic culture. In a society in which epistemic anxiety is suppressed,
neither tolerance nor liberty can long survive.
Conclusion
Finally, I would like to say a last word regarding the common connotations of the term ‘anxiety.’ While I have tried to show that there are good
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reasons for accepting a use of the term that is positive, rather than negative,
it should also be clear that the mindset that I am propounding is a diﬃcult
one. The conscious acceptance of anxiety, in the sense I have outlined here,
represents the embrace of a higher level of self-responsibility. This is not
an easy task, nor should we expect it to be. If virtuous attitudes and behaviors came easily, we would all live in near utopias. This is one thing that
religious consciousness understands and that liberals have been too reluctant to insist upon. Genuine liberal democracy, like genuine spirituality,
makes serious, sometimes even unpleasant, demands on its practitioners.
We must give something up, in order to gain something immeasurably
greater—in this case, the ignorant bliss of a self-satisfied understanding,
for a society in which people are free to choose for themselves not only
how to interpret the world but also how to live in it.
Sartre, at one point, observes that the existentialists’ diagnosis of the
human condition is rejected “not [because of] our pessimism, but the
sternness of our optimism.”66 We live in a world in which only a stern
optimism is a credible optimism. Anxiety regarding our inescapable
fallibility-in-finitude represents more than a past turning point in human
history; it represents the maturation of human consciousness, and maturity, like civilization, has its discomforts. But without an ever-present sense
of such anxiety, we fall back into a self-satisfaction (or worse, a nervous
bellicosity) that belies the fundamental truth revealed in all of the world’s
great traditions of wisdom: we are imperfect.67
The George Washington University
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